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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

Table 1 below lists the series used, their source
and the results of the spectral estimates. The results
of the harmonictrend version, as with the Canadian
data, are generally favourable to the hypothesis
with long cycles indicated in about three-fifth of
the series, including most of the more important
ones such as GNP, NNP, investment, employment,
construction, prices, etc. The indication of a peak
at 40 years in population and immigration,two very
important variables in theoretical discussions on
long cycles, likely reflects a very strong trend in
these series which has been only partially removed.
Again, the growth-rate version is extremely sympathetic toward the hypothesis, indicating long
swings in 34 of the 44 series. This is likely the
most significant result since taking first differences
is currently the most popular method of trend elimination among long-swing students. It will also be
noted that the period of the indicated swing in
growth rates is shorter than that for deviations from
trend. This conformswith results obtained by other
workers, in the United States and Canada, using
less sophisticated techniques. Those working with
growth rates using some sort of moving average have
found long cycles to be about 14 years in duration

while those applying the same sort of method to
deviations from trend have found long swings which
average about 22 years.
Thus, the overall results suggest that there are,
in fact, long swings in the deviations from trend of
a significant number of important time series, contrary to the findings of earlier spectral analysts like
Adelman and Hatanaka and Howrey who found
no evidence of long cycles in the series they tested.
Given the results of Bird et al.8 which cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the methods which have
traditionally been used for the analysis of long
swings, spectral analysis offers the most reliable
and sophisticated method for investigating the
existence of this phenomenon. While many may
feel that their belief in long cycles has been vindicated by this note, we might add a note of caution
that any chronologies of long swings based on the
old techniques are still useless, given the biases
uncovered by Bird et al. Not only existence, but
chronology, will have to be the object of new
techniques.
8 Roger C. Bird, Meghnad J. Desai, Jared J. Enzler and
Paul Taubman, "'Kuznets Cycles' in Growth Rates: The
Meaning," Indian Economic Review, VI (May 1965), pp.
229-239.

TAXES AND SHARE VALUATION IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
VernonL. Smith
This paper extends the fundamental theorem of
share (or capital) valuation [1, 2, 3], under conditions of certainty and purely competitive markets,
to allow for the distinction between capital gains
and income in the taxation of personal income. The
objective is to develop the theorem for the tax case
in a form general enough to allow for corporations
both currently and not currently paying a dividend.
However, the general derivation is sufficiently
tedious to warranta presentation which begins with
less general cases. Accordingly,we will first develop
the share valuation equation for a continuous discount version of the taxless case for corporations
either paying or not paying a dividend. Then we
turn to the effect of income and capital gains taxes
for corporations currently paying a dividend; and
finally the more general case. The derivations will
be simplifiedby assuming a constant rate of interest
over time, but all the theorems can be extended to
deal with foreseen changes in interest over time.

worth or capitalized value at t of the future dividend payments of the corporation. Suppose the
corporationis not currently paying a dividend, but
it is known that at time t* (i.e., t* - t years in
the future) dividends will begin, and be paid at
an annual rate D(r) > O, r : tO. If r' is the continuous equilibrium force of interest (equal also to
the marginal productivity of capital), then the
market value of the corporation is
V(t) =
ft
D(T)
et (TDt)

D(r) e-r (T-t*) dr, if t < t1
dT, if t : t*.

Differentiating (1), to evaluate V(t)

dV(t)
d , and

then substituting from (1), gives
V(t) = { /r V(t), if t < t*
if t
t*
r' V(t) -D(t),
(2)
Taxes
of
Absence
I Share Valuation in the
Equation (2) constitutes a continuous form of the
In a world without risk or taxes, the competitive fundamental theorem of share valuation, derived
t*, in the conmarket value of a corporation's outstanding com- by Samuelson [3], for the case t
mon stock V(t), at time t, must equal the present text of capital-income theory and by Modigliani
-
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~~~~~~n
and Miller [2, p. 412] in the context of share
a = XAj.(I
i>
-ai) =1
valuation theory. Thus, for a corporation not yet
paying a dividend, its market value rises at a Similarly, total after tax capital gains income, on
percentage rate equal to the instantaneous return a gain of V(t + T) - V(t), is ,B[V(t + T) on capital (equal to the market rate of interest) V(t)], where
until dividend payments begin. Thereafter, share
n
n
value increases at a percentage rate equal to the
XjiA(1-bi)
A=
=
ibi.
i=1
i=1
difference between the return on capital and the
We assume no change in the income distribution of
stock holders over time so that a and /8 are indepercentage dividend yield i.e., r' (t) - V ().
V (t)
pendent of t.
If the after tax force of interest is r, the valuaII Taxes and ShareValues for Dividend-Paying
tion formula corresponding to (1) for a dividend
Corporations
paying corporation is
Assume next that all investors in the shares of a
(t+T
t) dT
V(t) = J
aD(T)e-r(T
given corporation are subject to a personal income
tax on dividends, and a tax at a different rate on
+ 8[V(t + T) - V(t)]e-rT
capital gains realized over holding periods of at
+ V(t)e-rT.
(3)
least T years.2 Let xi be the proportion of the corporation's stock held by investors in the ith mar- In equilibrium share value is the present worth of
ginal income tax bracket. Let the marginal income the net return from dividends and capital gains plus
tax rate in the ith bracket be ai, and the marginal capital recovery (the three terms on the right).
When the equality in (3) holds, an investor
capital gains (or loss) tax rate be bi. After tax
dividend income is thus X,D(T) - X1aiD(r) at would be indifferent between holding a share in
time T for investors in the ith bracket. If there are V(t) and lending the equivalent sum at interest, r.
n brackets the total after tax dividend income of If V(t) exceeded the after tax discounted value of
dividends and capital, then shares would be overthe corporation'sstock holders is aD(T), where
valued, and investors could gain by selling their
1 Equations (1) and (2) generalize very easily when the
holdings and lending at interest (or would elect to
interest rate r'(u), is a forseen function of time, u. Then
lend at interest in place of purchasingshares). This
t*
T- f
would depress share values, and lower the interest
ft
t*
r 00
rate. The process would continue causing shares to
e
dr, if t < t*
f t*D (T) e
be more attractive and lending to be less attractive
(1') V(t) =
T
until the equality held in (3). Similarly, if V(t)
r0
was below the discounted value on the right, shares
dr if t
t*
ft D(T)e
would be purchased, and funds borrowed,increasing
and
share values and interest rates until the equality
held.
r'(t) V(t) - D(t) , if t t*.
In a perfect capital market, with foreseen diviIf the number of shares, S, is constant over time then of
dends and capital gains, it is also the case, in
course share price change is just P(t) = V(t)IS. If the
equilibrium,that no investor would desire to realize
number of shares outstanding, S(t), varies over time we
let V(t) = P(t) S(t), and D(T) = d(T) S(T), where d(T)
a capital gain after a holding period of less than T.
is per share dividend yield. Since V(t) = P(t) S(t) +
If he did, the gain would be taxed as income at a
P(t) S(t), (2') takes the more general form
higher rate than if the holding period is T or more.
He would therefore find it preferable to borrow to
f
[r(t) I P(t)
ift<t*
satisfy any current cash needs in excess of current
S(t)
__t
(2")
income. For holding periods in excess of T, he
( )
would
be indifferent between selling shares, and
`
gP(t) -d(t) , if t
l[r(t)-5
t*,
borrowing to raise money, as the two alternatives
would have identical effects upon his asset position.
where S(t)/S(t)' is the annual percentage stock dividend,
It follows, that equilibrium requires the market to
which of course, "waters" the per share price but has no
effect, in a perfect market, on the market value of the firm. continuously discount the after tax capital gain
2 In the United States dividend receipts are taxed at
,/[V(t + T) - V(t)], which is potentially realizprogressive rates, while capital gains realized over holding
able
T years in the future.
periods of six months or more (T = 1/2, if the time unit
We first collect terms in V(t), and write (3) in
is a year) are tazed at one-half the income tax rate up to
a maximum of 25 per cent.
the form
7)

F

tt7d

-

{
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[1

V(t)

(1 -

-

3)e-rT]

rt+T

=

f tT

dr

aD(T)e-r(T-t)

(4)
+ ,/V(t + T)e-rT.
Now, by iteration of (4) we can derive an expression for V(t) as an infinite sum (or'finite, if we
had assumed a finite market discount horizon [2,
pp. 421-422]) entirely in terms of the future dividend stream. This is because, ultimately, V(t) is
determined only by the discounting of future dividend yield. Thus, at t + (k - 1)T, k = 1,2,3, ...,
the market value of the firm must be given by
V [ t + (k-1 ) T] in the expression
3)e-rT]
V[t + (k - 1)T] [1 - (1tt+kT
t+(k-1)T

J

dT

aD(T)e-r[E-t-(k-1)T1

the discounting of the potential capital gains (loss)
over the N periods of length T, and the discounting
of both dividends and potential capital gains (loss)
thereafter.
The expression in V(t) correspondingto (4) is
now
(7)
= /3V(t+T)e-rT.
V(t) [1 - (1-/3)e-rT]
By iteration,
[1- (1- 8)e-rT]
V(t+T)
8
+ 2T)e-rT
/3V(t

V[t + (N- 1)T] [1 - (1-_8)e-rT]
= /3V(t + NT)e-rT
V[t + NT] [1- (1- 8)e-rT]
J'e-r(t*-NT-t)
(N++1)T

(t+

+ /3V(t + kT), k = 1,2,3....
By iterative substitution for V(t + T), V(t + 2T),

J

... into (4), we get

+ /3V[t + (N +

t*

dT

aD(T)e-rT-tN*)

1)T]e-rT

00

=

V(t)

t+ (k-l)T

J

-

I a/3k-1[1
k=1
tt+kT

e-r(k-l)T

(1-/.)e-rT]-k

V[t + (N + k)T]I1
dr,

D (rT)e-r[T-t-(k-1)T]

(5)

if the sum converges. Differentiating and then
substituting from (5) gives
*00

V(t)

=

I a/3k-l[ik=1

(1-,8)e-rT]

{ D[t

+ kT]e-rT

-D[t

+ (k

-

1)T]}

-k e-r(k-l)T

rt+

1_

)-T

(N+k+l)T

Jt+(N +k) T

aD (T)

e

r[,r-t-(N+

k) TI dr

+ /3V[t + (N + k + 1)T]e-rT.

By iterative substitution for V(t + T), V(t + 2T),
.. ., V[t + (N + k)T], ... we can solve for V(t):
V(t) = a/iN [1 - (1-,#)e-rT]-(N+l)

Jt+ (N+1)T

dr

D(T)e-r(T-t)

+ rV(t),

(6)
00

which provides the fundamental valuation theorem
+ I a/3N+k [1 - (1-/)e-rT]-(N+k+1)
k=1
for arbitrary tax law parameters a, /8 and T, where
(t+ (N+k+1)T
1, 0 </3 -- 1, and T > 0. If a = /8 = 1
0 < a
(8)
J
D(T)e-r(T-t) dT,
(no taxes), equation (6) reduces to (2) for the
t+ (N+k)T
dividend paying corporation.
provided that the sum converges. Differentiating
and substituting as before:
III Extensionto Non Dividend-PayingCorporations
V(t) = a/iN [1 - (1-,8)e-rT]-(N+l)
Suppose the corporationat time t is not paying a
D[t + (N + 1)T]e-r(N+1)T
dividend, but it is known that dividends will begin
00
0 -Tat t* = t + NT +0T>0
0 >T, N an
+ I a/3N+k [1 - (1-,8)e-rT]-(N+k+l)
k=1
integer. That is, measured in terms of multiples of
the holding period T (which separates "short" from
e-(N+k)rT D[t + (N+k+l)T]e-rT
"long-term" capital gains) dividends will begin
- D[t + (N+k)T]
(9)
+ rV(t).
between t + NT and t + (N + 1)T, at a point
with
a
which divides that interval into subintervals
For t < t* (current dividends zero), the taxno dividend, and 1 - 0 with positive dividends. generalized fundamental theorem of share valuation
Diagrammatically:
is given by (9); for t - t* (current dividends
positive) it is given by (6). Mathematically, what
TT
we have done in (8) and (9) is treat explicitly the
T- T
eproblem of a discontinuous dividend stream. If we
t*
t +(N+I)T
t+NT
t
t+(N+2)T
0 be the dividend stream without any
let f(T)
then it is a straightforward
restrictions,
continuity
by
is
determined
at
t
value
It follows that share

{
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NOTES
matter (albeit tedious) to write conditions like (8)
and (9) for any given f(T) function. By a suitable
partitioning of the domain of integration, these expressions can be written for any stuttering flow of
dividends; for example,
O, t

T < t*

-

A

f(T)=

D*(T)

> 0O t* -- T<

0, t

T < t**

--

t

Observe that in a taxless world, with a = 3 = 1,
QR = - 1, and the expression (10) is just the
present worth of a stream of receipts growing at
the constant rate g < r from the initial value D(t).
Making the above substitution for D(T) = D (t*)
eg(T-t*) in (8),
D (t*) 8N[1 -(
) e-rT]-N e(g-r)NT
r
V(t) =
g-r

D**(T) > 0, t** :` T.

{Q

IV ShareValuationUnder ConstantGrowth
The above formulas are not very practical tools
If the
until we postulate special forms for D(T).
corporation'sdividend growth rate is a constant, g,
then the dividend functions in (5) and (6) are
D (T) =D (t) eg('r-t)
D[t + kT] =D(t) egkT
D[t + (k - 1)T] =D(t) eg(k-1)T
Substituting in (5), and evaluating the sum, we
obtain
R t) r > g
(10)
V (t) =
where
a[

-

R

-

(1-

- e-(g-r)NT-r(t*-t)]

}

(12)
+ Qeg(t-t*)(R - 1)
Note that when N = 0 and t = t* (12) reduces to
(10).
Finally, making the growth function substitutions
in (9) we have
V(t) = D(t*)

/3N[1 - (1-3)e-rT]-N
e(g-r)NT-g (t -t*)

Q { [1 -

e-(g-r)Tl-I

+ R- 1

+ rV(t)
where V(t) is given by (12).

}
(13)
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[e(g-r)T
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COMMENT ON THE "H" CONCENTRATION MEASURE AS
A NUMBERS-EQUIVALENT
M. A. Adelman
The H concentration measure (so designated market. (3) An important virtue both for combecause it was independently devised by 0. C. Her- puting and for using it is the quick convergence to
findahl and A. 0. Hirschmann) is defined as the a limit. Explaining its virtues will also show (4)
sum of squared percentages of market. (Thus with its principal weakness.
three firms of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2, H would be 0.25 +
I
0.09 + 0.04 = 0.38.) It has not had a very wide
use. In this note we (1) derive it from some
Consider the very familiar cumulative concengeneral premises, and (2) show how it can be incurve. On the vertical (y) axis we have
tration
terpreted as a "numbers-equivalent"1 in any given
from zero to 100 per cent of the industry. On the
1 Robert L. Bishop, "Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities, and
Market Relationships," American Economic Review, 42, pp.
779-803, especially 788-789; and "Comment," 43, pp. 91819. Strictly speaking, Bishop's paper was concerned with the

relationship of only two firms. I consider it as the classic
statement of the oligopoly problem involving any number
of firms.
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